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Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appears to be a
model of simplicity and clarity. It reads, "A civil action is commenced
by filing a complaint with the court." In defining "commencement" it
also appears to provide guidance on how to begin an action which com-
plies with a statute of limitations. I Because of the decision in Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp. ,2 that appearance is misleading in regard to state
statutes of limitations applicable in federal court actions brought on the
basis of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. In Walker the Supreme
Court stated there is "no indication that. . .Rule [3] was intended to
toll a state statute of limitations, much less that it purported to displace
state tolling rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations."3 The
Court then proceeded to hold that the state commencement provision,
requiring service of process, was to be applied to determine whether the
action had been brought in time to comply with the state statute of
limitations.4 The above-quoted statement from Walker makes refer-
* B.A. 1964, University of Texas; J.D. 1967, University of Texas; LL.M. 1973, University of
Texas. Professor of Law, St. Mary's University of San Antonio, School of Law. The author
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1. In Moore Co. v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co., 347 F.2d 921 (8th Cir. 1965),
the court held filing alone was sufficient to commence an action within the four-year federal stat-
ute of limitations for private actions under the federal anti-trust laws. The court based its holding
on Rule 3, which it viewed as "unmistakedly stat[ing] in plain, clear, well-understood and unam-
biguous language that an action is commenced by filing the complaint." Id at 922. The court
also found justification for its holding in the fact that the statute of limitations was enacted subse-
quent to the effective date of Rule 3 and provided that actions would be barred unless "com-
menced" within four years. This, the court saw as further evidence that Congress intended to
require only filing. Id at 925. Nowhere in the opinion does the court express any reservation as
to its conclusion that Rule 3 speaks to commencement for the purposes of a statute of limitations.
"If Congress or the rule makers had intended to impose [an additional requirement], it would
have been a simple matter to include the condition by appropriate language in the rule or the
statute." Id
2. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
3. Id at 750-51.
4. Id at 753. In the same term the Court held in a civil rights action brought in federal court
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979) that a state's tolling provision, as well as its statute of
limitations, is to be applied unless inconsistent with federal policies underlying the cause of action.
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ence only to state statutes of limitations, and the Court expressly
avoided deciding the role of Rule 3 in regard to federal statutes of limi-
tations.' It is difficult, however, to perceive any basis in the language of
Rule 3 or in the reasoning of the Court for concluding that the role of
the Rule would change according to the nature of the authority enact-
ing the statute of limitations.6
The decision in Walker does, however, provide a warning to plain-
tiffs bringing actions in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.
They are told to bring those actions within the time provided by state
statutes of limitations and to do so in accordance with state provisions
defining commencement for limitations purposes, at least when those
provisions constitute an "integral" part of the statute of limitations."
The Walker decision was also not the first United States Supreme
Court decision giving this same warning. In 1949 in Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co. I the Court decided, in an almost identical
fact situation, that the Erie doctrine required the application of a simi-
lar state commencement provision in a federal diversity action. Appli-
cation of the state rule was required because otherwise the outcome of
the litigation would vary substantially from what it would have been
had the action been brought in state court. Even though that holding
was later brought into question,9 no reasonable person, having read
See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980). Although at issue was the suspension of
the running of the limitations period for the federal action during the pendency of a state court
action, the Court concluded that the state tolling rule must apply to the federal action primarily
because it was interrelated with the statute of limitations. Id at 485-86. The Court in Walker
viewed the state's commencement provision involved in that case as an "integral part" of its stat-
ute of limitations. 446 U.S. at 751-52. It seems clear, therefore, that had the Court in Tomanio
been considering instead the applicability of this commencement provision, it would have re-
quired the application of this type of state rule also.
5. Walker, 446 U.S. at 751 n.Il (1980).
6. That is not to say filing alone cannot be sufficient if Congress, through the language of a
particular federal statute of limitations, intended that to be the rule. See 347 F.2d at 925.
7. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 751-52. One gap in the reasoning of the Court arises because in
holding Rule 3 inapposite it does not consider whether any federal judge-made rule is or could be
applicable. One explanation for this gap, perhaps, is that any judge-made rule that would have
aided the plaintiff in that case would still have given way to the state rule under the doctrine of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Without consideration of a pertinent federal rule, the
Erie analysis by the Court is rather summary. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 752-53.
8. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
9. The continuing authority of Ragan became a matter of debate among the lower federal
courts after the Court's decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). In Hanna the Supreme
Court held that when a Federal Rule applied to a matter in issue even in the face of a conflicting
state rule, the question was whether the Rule was a valid exercise of the rulemaking power under
the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). Id at 471-74. In this situation the Erie doctrine
simply did not constitute the appropriate test. Id at 469-70.
The issue arose because Ragan's refusal to apply Rule 3 in the face of a conflicting state rule
was on the basis of Erie, but the Court in Hanna distinguished Ragan as a case in which the scope
of the Federal Rule was simply not as broad as the plaintiff had urged. Id at 470 & n.12. This
that case, could thereafter feel safe in relying on Rule 3 as the control-
ling commencement provision in diversity cases. Yet, since 1949,
ninety-one federal decisions in diversity cases have been reported in
which Rule 3's application as the controlling commencement rule for a
state statute of limitations has been in issue.' ° Although "tip of the
iceberg" arguments can be carried too far, it does not seem unreasona-
ble to suggest that the misreading of Rule 3 as a commencement provi-
sion has played a part in a number of cases that were settled because
plaintiff learned of the probable insufficiency of filing for limitations
purposes.
Knowing that state commencement provisions might apply in fed-
eral diversity actions does not solve the problem of finding the applica-
ble state provision. In diversity actions federal courts must apply the
choice of law or conflict of laws rule of the forum state." To find
which state will supply the applicable statute of limitations, therefore,
requires application of the conflict of laws rules and principles estab-
lished by the forum state.' 2 Even when the law of the forum will sup-
ply the applicable commencement provision, some care is required
since that state may have two provisions which appear to control com-
mencement of a suit. In Walker the Court noted that the state had a
distinction requires a strained interpretation of the basis of decision given in Ragan or at least
some degree of rather enlightened hindsight. Compare Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799, 801-02 (6th
Cir. 1973) (compliance with Rule 3 commences suit for state limitations purposes), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 989 (1974) and Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 604-06 (2d Cir. 1968)
(compliance with Rule 3 commences suit for state limitations purposes) with Groninger v.
Davison, 364 F.2d 638, 642 (8th Cir. 1966) (state commencement provision rather than Rule 3
controls for state limitations purposes).
10. See Appendix to this article. Justice Douglas alluded to one reason for the continuing
and frequent failure to act in accordance with the warning provided by Supreme Court decisions
when he said, "Those who read this opinion may have adequate warning. But this opinion, like
most, will become an obscure one--little known to the Bar." England v. Louisiana State Bd., 375
U.S. 411, 435 (1964) (concurring opinion). One might add that here, as opposed to issues involv-
ing abstention, there is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that appears clearly to provide guidance
so that the usual tendency of a litigant to research judicial decisions is weakened.
11. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
12. When a choice of law rule of a state would require the application of the law of another
state, only the substantive law of that state is to be applied--the procedural law of the forum
remains applicable. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 49 (2d ed.
1980). Statutes of limitations, although generally considered procedural for choice of law pur-
poses, are considered substantive when they are built into or contain specific reference to the
particular cause of action. These general rules are superseded, however, when the forum state has
promulgated a "borrowing" statute which directs application of statutes of limitations under
stated circumstances. See generally id. at 59-67. Borrowing statutes, when they direct the applica-
tion of another state's limitation period, will frequently require application be done under the
"laws" of that state, including laws regulating tolling and other related provisions. See Speight v.
Miller, 437 F.2d 781, 782-83 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1971); Vernon, Statutes of
Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 287, 307-10
(1960).
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general rule of procedure stating that an action is commenced by filing
plus the issuance of summons, but this was not the rule applicable to
commencement for limitations purposes. The applicable provision re-
quired, in addition, service of process within the limitations period or,
in the alternative, an attempt to serve within that period plus actual
service within sixty days thereafter.13 The plaintiff was thus required to
know that neither Rule 3 nor the general state provision meant what it
appeared to mean. 14
Failure to comply with a statute of limitations, unlike most proce-
dural missteps in federal court, terminates the plaintiffs claim and does
so for reasons having no direct relation to the justness of that claim on
the merits. If the failure to comply with state commencement require-
ments can be proved a result of the negligence of plaintiff's lawyer, then
perhaps plaintiff can replace his former cause of action with one for
malpractice.' 5 Even if this is so, the defendant, the one who allegedly
caused harm to the plaintiff, may escape liability because of what may
be nothing more than a technicality. 6 The Federal Rules generally
reflect a rejection of the attitude that procedure is a game wherein the
unwary can lose all. As Justice Black has written:
These rules were designed in large part to get away from some of the
old procedural booby traps which common-law pleaders could set to
prevent unsophisticated litigants from ever having their day in court.
If rules of procedure work as they should in an honest and fair judi-
cial system, they not only permit, but should as nearly as possible
guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on
the merits.'
7
Likewise, when a rule of procedure misleads or hides more than it tells
as to matters other than pleading, which have the potential for depriv-
13. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 740 & n.13.
14. The court of appeals viewed the state provision providing for commencement for limita-
tions purposes as "complex and even mysterious" and "technical and cumbersome" but felt com-
pelled to apply it. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 1133, 1135 (10th Cir. 1979).
15. See e.g., Wilcox v. Plumer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172, 183 (1830) (limitations expired before
filing); Hillhouse v. McDowell, 219 Tenn. 362, 371, 410 S.W.2d 162, 166 (1966) (attorney liable for
failure to bring action within limitations period); House v. Maddox, 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 73, 360
N.E.2d 580, 584 (1st Dist. 1977) (legal malpractice for attorney to fail to file within limitations
period); Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super, 290, 294-95, 319 A.2d 781, 784 (1974) (failure to
bring action within limitations period as evidence of neglect). If a legal technicality causes the
running of a limitations period, the lawyer may not be liable for malpractice. See In re Watts, 190
U.S. 1, 32 (1903) (innocent error not considered negligence).
16. The characterization of the limitations defense as a technicality is further explained in the
body of this article. In short, this characterization is legitimate when the defendant had full
knowledge of the filing of the action within the limitations period but is saved by formal or techni-
cal requirements not satisfied by the plaintiff.
17. Sufowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966).
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ing an unsophisticated or excusably-erring litigant of his day in court, it
should be changed.
It is my contention that because Rule 3 provides litigants with in-
accurate information pertaining to a crucial step in the process of adju-
dication it should be amended. A proposed amendment is, therefore,
presented and discussed in the latter part of this article. Deciding that
a Rule should be amended does not of course answer the question of
how it should be amended. When the deceptive appearance of simplic-
ity fostered by Rule 3 is peeled away one discovers a clutter of trouble-
some constitutional, statutory, and federalism problems that cannot be
easily swept aside. They must be considered before a proposal can be
formulated primarily because they most assuredly will be considered
by the authorities responsible for promulgating and approving such a
proposal as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The body of this article
is therefore dedicated to that task. First, however, it is necessary to
clarify the legal terminology used in relation to statutes of limitations
because the meaning of various of these terms is none too clear and
because, after all, this article is more than just tangentially concerned
with the meaning of legal words.
II. LIMITATIONS TERMINOLOGY
Statutes of limitations fix time limits within which designated
claims must be commenced.'" Typically, the fixed period established
by a statute of limitations is computed from the date on which the
claim for relief arose or accrued, which would ordinarily be the date on
which occurred the last event necessary to permit the bringing of an
action in court to assert that claim. 9 To comply with the command of
a statute of limitations, plaintiff must initiate or commence an action on
his claim within the prescribed period or it will be barred.2" In addi-
tion, a particular jurisdiction may provide for postponement of the be-
ginning of a limitations period or for suspension of the running of the
period under certain circumstances. For example, a person may not
discover that his injuries are the result of a negligent act until long after
18. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944); Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879). "The lapse of years without any attempt to
enforce a demand creates ... a presumption against its original validity, or that it has ceased to
subsist." Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868).
19. See generally Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177,
1200-20 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
20. See A.J. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk Ry., 236 U.S. 662, 667 (1915). "Under such a statute
the lapse of time not only bars the remedy but destroys the liability .. "Id at 667. See also
Kansas City S. Ry. v. Wolf, 261 U.S. 133, 140 (1923); Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904). See
generally Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law.- Federal Rights ofAction
and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1016-18 (1980).
No. 31
Southern Illinois University Law Journal
that act has occurred; and, technically, once a negligent act has caused
damage, a claim sufficient to allow suit arises. Under these circum-
stances some jurisdictions provide that the applicable statute of limita-
tions will begin to run from the time plaintiff discovered or should have
known that he was harmed by the negligence of defendant rather than
from the time the negligence occurred.2 The running of a limitations
period may also be suspended for the period during which a defendant
is outside the jurisdiction of the state.22
If an action is properly commenced within the limitations period,
there may be further limitations problems raised by an amendment to
the plaintiffs pleading that changes the cause of action or the parties.
This question, in terms used by Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, is whether the amended complaint "relates back" to the
date on which the action was brought under the original complaint.23
An action commenced in compliance with the applicable statute of lim-
itations may also fail for procedural or jurisdictional reasons either
before or after the expiration of the limitations period. If it fails before
the end of that period and plaintiff fails to recommence the action
before the period expires, plaintiff may be able to successfully argue
that the limitations period was suspended during the pendency of the
first suit. If the original action is dismissed after the limitations period
has expired, either suspension or a "savings" statute (allowing recom-
mencement within a specified period) may preserve plaintiffs claim. 4
"Tolling" is the term used generally to characterize rules that pro-
vide an exception to the mechanical calculation and application of a
21. See, e.g., White v. Schnoebelen, 19 N.H. 273, 275-76, 18 A.2d 185, 186-87 (1949) (period
commences when lightning causes damage, not when lightning rod negligently installed); Cardin
v. McClellan, 85 S.W. 267, 272-73 (Tenn. 1905) (period calculated from time vendee deprived of
property, not from time of negligent filing of deed); Theurer v. Condon, 34 Wash. 2d 448, 455, 209
P.2d 311, 315 (1949) (period measured from time of fire, rather than time of negligent installation
of fuel tank). Contra Powers v. Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 219 N.C. 254, 256, 13 S.E.2d 431,
432 (1941) (period commences when agent fails to disclose that premises are contaminated, not
when lessee contracts tuberculosis).
22. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2416(a) (1976) (all periods excluded during which defendant or res
is outside the United States); Partis v. Miller Equip. Co., 324 F. Supp. 898, 900 (N.D. Ohio 1970)
(savings statute tolls limitation period during defendant's absence); Byrne v. Ogle, 488 P.2d 716,
717-18 (Alaska 1971) (purpose of statute to prevent plaintiff from being deprived of opportunity to
assert claim).
23. See Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. United States, 289 U.S. 28, 35 (1933). See generally Note,
Civil Procedure-The Erie Doctrine and Relation Back of Supplemental Pleadings Under Rule
15(c)-Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 621, 633-36 (1980). The test of
whether amendment relates back, for limitation purposes, is notice; and inquiry should focus on
notice given by general fact situation as set forth in original pleading. See also Rosenberg v.
Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1973); Oil Well Supply Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 106 F.2d 399,
404 (10th Cir. 1939).
24. See Developments, supra note 19, at 1243-44.
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limitations period, including rules regulating the actions necessary to
commence a suit in compliance with a statute of limitations.25 "Com-
mencement," however, seems a more precise term for discussing these
steps,26 although its use may lead to some confusion since the Supreme
Court's decision in Walker.27 Even so, "commencement" is more likely
than "tolling" to maintain a focus on the particular matters discussed in
this article and has been generally understood to refer to the steps nec-
essary for compliance with the command of a statute of limitations.28
It is also less cumbersome than some of the alternatives in that it can be
more easily and effectively used as both a noun and an adjective.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON
CONGRESS'S ENACTMENT OF PROCEDURAL RULES FOR
FEDERAL COURTS
In Hanna v. Plumer,29 the Supreme Court held in a federal court
case based on diversity jurisdiction that Rule 4(d)(1)3° of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was valid and controlling in the face of a con-
flicting state rule. Plaintiff in Hanna had complied with Rule 4(d)(1)
by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with defendant's
wife at his residence, but the state rule required delivery in hand to an
executor of an estate, which was the capacity in which defendant was
sued. Defendant argued that to disregard the state rule would cause a
substantial variance in the outcome of this litigation from what it
would have been if brought in state court and that, therefore, under the
rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,3 as refined in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
25. For example, in order to ensure an adequate remedy to an aggrieved person without the
hardship of being forced to travel to a foreign jurisdiction to enforce his claim, the prescribed
limitation period would run from the time that the alleged wrongdoer became subject to the juris-
diction of the forum state. See Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U.S. 72, 77 (1876). See
generally Note, Federal Rule 3 and the Tolling of State Statutes of Limitations in Diversity Cases, 20
STAN. L. REV. 1281 (1968).
26. Commencement defines the activity that more or less permanently tolls the statute of
limitations. For a discussion of what constitutes "commencement" in various jurisdictions, see
Developments, supra note 19, at 1237-44.
27. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 750.
28. See 347 F.2d at 922.
29. 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(l) provides that service may be made:
Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy
of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at
his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discre-
tion then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint
to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.
31. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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York, 32 the state rule must be applied. 33 The Supreme Court in Hanna
responded with the observation that Erie had never been invoked to
void a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, 4 distinguishing Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer Co. 11 as a decision in which Rule 3 was held not to
apply to the matter to be decided.36
In Hanna the Court held that Erie was not the appropriate author-
ity for determining the validity of a Federal Rule because that case
concerned the applicability of federal rules of general common law that
were not authorized by any grant of federal authority in the Constitu-
tion.37 Erie did not involve a Federal Rule but rather dealt with a
question which was clearly "substantive. 3 8 In Hanna the question in-
volved a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure promulgated pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act and Congress has constitutional authority to pro-
vide rules of practice and procedure for lower federal courts.39
Both article I and article III of the Constitution grant Congress
power to create federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court.' In addi-
tion, the Necessary and Proper Clause of article I supports Congress's
power to enact laws appropriate for carrying into execution these spe-
cific delegated powers. 4' The power to create lower federal courts
therefore is augmented by the power to make rules controlling the pro-
cedural operation of those courts. The scope of these powers is not
limited by reference to state powers except in the sense that only state
power exists beyond the constitutional reach of Congress.42 Therefore,
32. 326 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1945).
33. 380 U.S. at 466:
Reduced to essentials, the argument is:
(1) Erie, as refined in York, demands that federal courts apply state law whenever ap-
plication of federal law in its stead will alter the outcome of the case.
(2) In this case, a determination that the Massachusetts service requirements obtain
will result in immediate victory for respondent. If, on the other hand, it should be held
that Rule 4(d)(l) is applicable, the litigation will continue, with possible victory for
petitioner.
(3) Therefore, Erie demands application of the Massachusetts rule.
34. Id at 470.
35. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
36. In Ragan, the Supreme Court held that the state rules of procedure controlled.
But the holding of each such case was not that Erie commanded displacement of a Fed-
eral Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was
not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which
covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law.
380 U.S. at 470.
37. The Court in Erie held that no federal general common law can exist because no provi-
sion in the Constitution authorizes either Congress or the federal courts to "declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State." 304 U.S. at 78.
38. 380 U.S. at 472.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
41. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-23 (1819).
42. The tenth amendment does not carve out any protected enclave of state powers. It simply
Rule 3
the fact that one of the Federal Rules conflicts with a state rule, even to
the extent that its applicability substantially varies the outcome of liti-
gation as between federal and state courts, does not make the Rule con-
stitutionally invalid.43 The constitutionality of a Federal Rule simply
does not turn on a substantive-procedural distinction.' The Necessary
and Proper Clause would be insufficiently elastic to support a Rule that
was clearly not procedural.45 Such a Rule would be challenged, how-
ever, as being beyond the need for efficient operation of a national
court system in that it was not sufficiently related to the oiling of the
mechanical process of adjudication.46 In the conclusory sense only
would it be substantive, assuming any law which is not procedural
must necessarily be substantive.
The difficulty in determining the scope of congressional power by
reference to a substantive-procedural distinction is that no clear, easily-
applied test exists for making this distinction.47 Congress cannot
achieve its purposes in providing uniform rules of procedure48 if those
rules are vulnerable to frequent constitutional challenge on the basis of
such an amorphous distinction. In recognizing this danger, the Court
in Hanna held that Congress's power included the power to regulate
matters "which, though falling within the uncertain area between sub-
stance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as ei-
ther.''49 Justice Harlan, concurring in Hanna, accurately characterized
this as an "arguably procedural, ergo constitutional" test, which he
contended went too far.50 Although Congress could conceivably abuse
makes explicit that which was implicit in the Constitution of 1787-powers not delegated to fed-
eral government are left to the states. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV.
693, 701-04 (1974). The tenth amendment does, however, protect certain traditional powers of the
state: "Congress may not exercise [the commerce] power so as to force directly upon the States its
choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are
to be made." National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976). Before a federal
statute violates this prohibition, it must satisfy each of three requirements: (1) regulate state gov-
ernment institutions directly ("States as States"); (2) address matters indisputably "attributes of
state sovereignty," and (3) directly impair the state's ability "to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional functions." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352,
2366 (1981). Regulation of federal procedure clearly fails to satisfy the first requirement.
43. See 380 U.S. at 472: "Neither York nor the cases following it ever suggested that the rule
there laid down for coping with situations where no Federal Rule applies is coextensive with the
limitation on Congress to which Erie had adverted."
44. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105, 1123 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
45. See id at 1123 n.98.
46. See id
47. Erie makes no clear-cut distinction between substance and process. See 304 U.S. at 74.
York stands for the proposition that the outcome should be substantially the same if tried in a
federal court as it would have been had the case been tried in state court. See 326 U.S. at 107-10.
48. See Sunderland, The Grant ofRule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United
States, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1116, 1124 (1934).
49. 380 U.S. at 472.
50. See id at 476.
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its powers by using procedure as a pretext,5' that possibility is not a
reason for denying it ample means by which to provide for the efficient
operation of the federal court system or for requiring dependence on
the states for these purposes.52 The rationality test established by
Hanna (or the arguably procedural test) provides Congress ample lee-
way under the Constitution to establish procedural rules even though
those rules may supplant arguably substantive state rules on occasion.53
Whether Congress, in enacting the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,54
meant to exercise its full constitutional power, however, is another
question.
A. Ely's Interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act
Although the struggle for procedural reform in the federal courts
leading to the Enabling Act began as early as 19115 it was stalled by
opposition which feared, in part, that federal rules would impose a
more complicated system of procedure than that developed in some
states.56 When the bill that became law was introduced, however, its
passage was surprisingly rapid and without substantial opposition."
51. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423:
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by
the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws
for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the
painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to
say that such an act was not the law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and
is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake
here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circum-
scribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground.
52. See id at 424:
No trace is to be found in the constitution of an intention to create a dependence of the
government of the Union on those of the States, for the execution of the great powers
assigned to it. Its means are adequate to its ends; and on those means alone was it
expected to rely for the accomplishment of its ends. To impose on it the necessity of
resorting to means which it cannot control, which another $overnment may furnish or
withhold, would render its course precarious, the result of its measures uncertain, and
create a dependence on other governments, which might disappoint its most important
designs, and is incompatible with the language of the constitution.
53. The scope of this power is not thereby unlike the scope of the commerce power which
allows intrusion on state powers over "local" matters. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1937).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
55. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1003, at 40
(1971).
56. See id at 41.
57. "The actual enactment of the bill was astonishingly casual. . . . The discussion in the
two houses consumed only a few minutes each." Attorney General Homer S. Cummings had sent
a letter to the judicial committees of each House recommending the bill so as to bring about
"uniformity and simplicity in the practice in actions at law in Federal courts and thus relieve the
courts and the bar of controversies and difficulties which are continually arising wholly apart from
the merits of the litigation in which they are interested." P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 673-74
(1973); see 78 CONG. REC. 9362-63 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 10,866 (1934).
The Enabling Act delegates power to the Supreme Court to prescribe
by general rules the practice and procedure of the lower federal
courts. 8 Under the Act these rules cannot come into effect until the
expiration of ninety days after they have been reported to Congress by
the Chief Justice. The second sentence of the Act, in its present form,
states that these rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right."59 The original Act, prior to its revision in 1948, had
included the phrase "of any litigant" following "substantive right. '60
Professor John Hart Ely has argued that the second sentence im-
poses a substantive-procedural distinction not found in the constitution
which, unless it is to be rendered meaningless, 61 must be seen as evi-
dence that Congress intended to limit the scope of the power delegated
to the Supreme Court.62 This substantive-procedural distinction, how-
ever, is not to be determined under the Erie- York analysis, but rather
under an analysis of the scope of the constitutional and statutory au-
thority to prescribe Federal Rules,63 as the Court recognized in Hanna.
The Enabling Act was clearly intended to be the authority for a set of
rules to be applied in federal courts regardless of the basis of subject
matter jurisdiction. If the Erie test were applied to the Federal Rules,
this intent would be substantially frustrated since the application of
many of the Rules in lieu of contrary state rules would be outcome
determinative.'
Professor Ely's reasoning proceeds as follows: (1) the Constitu-
tion imposes no "substantive" restriction on Congress's rulemaking
power and would allow modification of substantive rights to some ex-
tent; (2) the Enabling Act in imposing such a restriction on the Federal
Rules therefore evidences Congress's intent to exercise less than all of
its constitutional rulemaking power; and (3) this limitation in the En-
abling Act was not meant to be defined by reference to the Rules of
Decision Act as interpreted in Erie and its progeny. To further support
step three, Professor Ely points out that once the constitutional basis for
the Enabling Act is established, that Act stands as the more recent stat-
ute and, therefore, is controlling as to inconsistencies between it and
the Rules of Decision Act, which is the statutory basis of Erie. More-
58. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1976)).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
60. Act of June 19, 1934 Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1976)).
61. See Ely, supra note 42, at 724 n.171.
62. See Ely supra note 42, at 718-19. The act imposes the enclave theory restriction to protect
state-created substantive rights. See 497 F. Supp. at 1123.
63. 380 U.S. at 473-74.
64. See Ely, supra note 42, at 721.
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over, the Rules of Decision Act itself directs federal courts to apply
state law except when "Acts of Congress otherwise require or pro-
vide."65 Furthermore, the Enabling Act contains the statement that all
laws in conflict with the Federal Rules shall be of no further force or
effect.66
The next step in Professor Ely's reasoning is the determination of
the nature of the substantive rights protected under the Enabling Act
or, more precisely, the formulation of a test for determining when a
Rule runs afoul of the Enabling Act's independent substantive-proce-
dural distinction. He proposes we begin by looking to the character of
the state provision to be supplanted by the enforcement of a Federal
Rule.67 If that state provision embodies a substantive policy rather
than simply a different view of what is the fairest and most efficient
mode of conducting litigation,68 the Federal Rule should not be ap-
plied.69 A substantive policy or, more particularly, a right derived from
such a policy, is to be defined "as a right granted for one or more non-
procedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with
the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process."70 Professor Ely
places emphasis on the purposes or policies of the state rule because he
assumes the subversion of state substantive policies was what Congress
by the second sentence of the Act sought to avoid.7' Recognizing that a
state provision can have both procedural and substantive goals, he ar-
gues that the attempt must be to identify that goal which transcends
concern for the conduct of litigation.72 If that nonprocedural goal is
frustrated by the application of a Federal Rule, the specific prohibition
of the second sentence of the Enabling Act overrides the general power
of the first sentence.73 The goals or purposes protected thereby are de-
fined, under Professor Ely's analysis, primarily as those which are non-
procedural, which makes unnecessary the further step of independently
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). A Federal Rule may not enjoy the same status as an Act
passed by the Congress and signed by the President, but it does override those rules requiring
adherence to state procedure. See Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 554 F.2d 1165, 1168
n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1977); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 284 (1976) (White J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
67. See Ely, supra note 42, at 722.
68. Id
69. See id at 734.
70. Id at 725.
71. See id at 724 n. 170. He also recognizes that a focus on a Rule's effects would make any
test either unintelligible or would lead to the wholesale defeat of Congress's attempt to establish
uniform rules since any rule can arguably have procedural and substantive effects. See 497 F.
Supp. at 1123.
72. See Ely at supra note 42, at 726.
73. See id at 719, 734.
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identifying them as substantive.74 Moreover, he carefully avoids the
need to look to the often nonexistent legislative history75 of a state pro-
vision by looking instead to the language of the state provision itself to
find evidence of its purposes.76
In applying his test to Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co. ,77 Professor Ely finds that the Court in applying a state provision
requiring service of process, instead of Rule 3, to determine whether
that diversity action was properly commenced was correct but for the
wrong reason. 78 The Court mistakenly applied the Erie rule to decide
the case but by refusing to apply Rule 3 had, in effect, protected a non-
procedural policy of the state commencement provision. One of the
purposes of a statute of limitations, which is directly served by a service
requirement, is the protection of a potential defendant's right to
"breathe easy" after the expiration of the limitations period.7 9 To find
that only the filing of a complaint within that period was required
would have frustrated that policy and the right engendered thereby.
The fact that perhaps only a minor delay in giving the defendant notice
would result was not seen by Professor Ely as significant since "the
difference between the actual provisions was a difference between no-
tice and no notice, and that goes to the essence of the right the state
legislature seems to have been trying to create." 80
Once one encounters the compelling clarity of Professor Ely's
thinking it is difficult to break free of its spell, but his conclusion, if
accepted, would cause lawyers some substantial research problems. In
a diversity case one must first identify the state rule to be supplanted by
an applicable Federal Rule. This would not be difficult if the conflict-
ing state provision were contained in a well-indexed code of state pro-
cedure. As has been noted the existence of one such state rule does not,
of course, foreclose the possibility that another rule on the subject
might exist.8 ' Even a state rule contained in a body of procedural rules
may have nonprocedural purposes. For example, Professor Ely sug-
gests that the broad scope of discovery allowed under rule 26(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules might well be subject to an Enabling Act challenge if
a state's narrower discovery provisions were based on concerns for
74. See id at 725 n.172.
75. See id at 724 n.171.
76. See id at 726.
77. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
78. See Ely, supra note 42, at 730.
79. Id at 731.
80. Id at 731 n.203.
81. See text accompanying notes 12 and 13, .spra.
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privacy.12
If research revealed no state procedural or statutory provision on
the subject, then research of state court decisions would be required to
determine why the state legislature has not spoken on the matter. In
applying his analysis to the facts of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. ,3 Profes-
sor Ely suggests that if the Court had found the otherwise applicable
state law did not provide for the medical examination ordered in that
case pursuant to Rule 35, it should have proceeded to determine why
this was so.84 He then discusses the possible reasons for such a failure;
but he omits an important step, that is, finding the state authority for
those reasons. If a state's highest court has elaborated on the reasons
for the state's refusal to allow medical examination of litigants, a less
sophisticated lawyer than Professor Ely could perhaps carry out his
analysis. This may often not be the case. A substantial problem often
encountered in diversity cases is simply determining what the court-
made law of a state is on a particular subject when the state's highest
court has not decided the matter. An extensive body of federal law has
been created, under the label of Pullman abstention, to deal with cases
in which part of the federal court's problem is caused by unclear state
law. 5
If the potentially applicable state law can be identified with some
degree of certainty, one could then proceed to identify the arguably
nonprocedural purposes or goals of that law. We can assume that if the
Court accepted Professor Ely's argument, his test would receive judicial
elaboration and, hopefully, competent lawyers could use it with some
degree of proficiency. Those lawyers, being competent, would also be
able to generate substantial extra federal pretrial and appellate litiga-
tion on the rather subtle issues necessarily inherent in this mode of
analysis. Of course, to this point we have considered only the need to
research the law of one state; but modem choice of law rules, in their
focus on significant contracts, open the door to the possibility that fo-
rum choice among states could determine which state's law was poten-
tially applicable.8 6 Plaintifi's lawyer would then need to research the
82, Ely, supra note 42, at 722 n.162.
83. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
84. See Ely supra note 42, at 734. In Sibbach the petitioner challenged the authority of the
lower federal court to order her to submit to a medical examination as it was authorized to do by
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. She admitted that Rule 35 was a rule of proce-
dure but contended that it abridged her substantive rights in violation of the second sentence of
the Rules Enabling Act. The law of the state in which the cause arose allowed such examinations,
but the forum state did not. 312 U.S. at 6-11.
85. See generally Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
86. See generally R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 12, at 566-69.
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law of those states in which suit might be brought.8 7
Although the failure to discover or perceive a state substantive
policy might not cause every federal litigant to lose his lawsuit, no liti-
gant in federal diversity cases could afford to rely on the Federal Rules
without extensive, additional research and without suffering a great
deal of anxiety. One of the primary purposes for establishing uniform
federal procedural rules was to avoid having a different federal proce-
dure in each state.88 The Enabling Act was intended also to provide
readily ascertainable rules that would facilitate the interstate practice of
law.89 To accomplish this goal the Rules were shaped by the notion
that what was needed was a simplified practice without unnecessary
technicalities or distinctions so that litigation in federal court could
proceed efficiently and inexpensively to an adjudication on the mer-
its.90 Should Professor Ely's test be accepted, those important purposes
would be substantially frustrated. 9'
B. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Should Be Presumed Valid
The Supreme Court has refused to construe the delegation of
power to administrative agencies so as to defeat the manifest purpose
of the delegating Act.92 It has, in fact, sought to construe such statutory
powers in light of the complexity of the subject matter to be regulated
and the resulting need for flexible regulatory powers.93 As the Court
stated in Yakus v. United States, "Congress is not confined to that
method of executing its policy which involves the least possible delega-
tion of discretion to administrative officers." 94
Neither Congress nor the Court need show even this level of con-
cern in determining whether a Federal Rule is within the delegation of
the Enabling Act because, unlike most instances of delegation, that Act
requires the reporting of any proposed rule to Congress before it can
87. There would, of course, be restrictions as to personal jurisdiction but International Shoe
and its progeny and state long-arm statutes would still provide leeway. See International Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
88. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963), cited
with approval in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965).
89. 497 F. Supp. at 1120.
90. Address of Attorney General Cummings to Judicial Conference, Fourth Circuit (June 6,
1935), reprinted in 21 A.B.A.J. 403 (1935). See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("They shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.").
91. Consider this prospect in light of the fact 39,315 diversity cases were commenced between
June 30, 1979 and June 30, 1980. See THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 1981-1982: A CORNUCOPIA OF
INFORMATION ABOUT LAW, LAWYERS AND THE PROFESSION 536.
92. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 283-84
(1933).
93. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219-20 (1943).
94. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944).
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become effective. Once reported, Congress has a period of time within
which it can review and, if it so desires, veto a proposed rule. In this
way, Congress enjoys the benefit of the expertise of the Court and the
Advisory Committee in promulgating procedural rules yet still retains
final control in evaluating the particulars of any proposal.95 It is this
power of final review that provides the means by which Congress can
avoid the subversion of state or federal policies. Congress has, in fact,
exercised this power in dramatic fashion by staying the effective date of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 96 When it finally enacted the Federal
Rules of Evidence,97 it also enacted a statute to govern amendments to
those Rules.98 In that Act Congress retained an extensive review
power. Consequently, Congress need not rely on any inflexible stan-
dard gleaned from the words of the Enabling Act; it can take such ac-
tion as it sees fit through the exercise of its waiting period veto power.
By the active use of this power, Congress can protect those interests to
be affected by a proposed rule and do so before that rule becomes part
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, when Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act in
1934, it could not have been so singularly concerned with the subver-
sion of state substantive law.99 To begin with, the Enabling Act does
not expressly prohibit the modification of state substantive rights. The
original version of the Act prohibited modification of the "substantive
rights of any litigant."' ' One commentator noted in 1935 that this pro-
vision was possibly a reference to the distinction made under the Con-
formity Act in determining whether state procedural law was to be used
in federal court.' 0' The Conformity Act of 1872 had required federal
district courts to conform generally to the practice, pleadings, and
95. This "waiting period" type of legislative veto allows Congress to control policy as the
need develops rather than in advance by the establishment of elaborate standards. See Bruff &
Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation.- A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1373 (1977). The veto power is a method by which Congress can insure that
rule-making is consistent with its intent. Id. at 1417. There was also some existing authority to
allow Congress confidence that the waiting period veto retained in the Rules Enabling Act was
constitutional at least when the veto was exercised through legislation. See 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 56,
63 (1933).
96. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976)
as noted to that section).
97. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (reprintedin 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976)
as note to that section).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976).
99. Ely, supra note 42, at 724 n.170. Professor Ely assumes that it was the subversion of state
substantive policies that the framers of the Enabling Act wished to avoid.
100. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1976)).
101. See Sunderland, Character and Extent of the Rule-Making Power Granted U.S. Supreme
Court and Methods of Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A.J. 404, 405 (1935).
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modes of proceeding existing in the states in which they were located
when they heard civil cases other than equity and admiralty, unless
some other Act of Congress provided otherwise.' 02 During this same
period the federal courts, under the rule of Swoi v. Tyson,"°3 engaged in
the creation and application of general federal common law in diversity
cases at the expense of the otherwise applicable substantive law of the
states. 104 It was not until four years after the Enabling Act was passed
that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins made sensitivity for state substantive rights
the centerpiece of any discussion of federal adjudication in diversity
cases.
The Enabling Act was also passed shortly after the first wave of
New Deal legislation during which Congress had vigorously exercised
its power in an attempt to solve the economic depression. 105 Moreover,
it was not until one year after the passage of the Act that the Supreme
Court, for the first time in American history, invalidated a federal law
because of an unlawful delegation of legislative power by Congress.10 6
Congress had little reason therefore, after so recently flexing its consti-
tutional muscles, to be so cautious as to rigidly circumscribe the
rulemaking power it granted the Supreme Court and over which it re-
tained ultimate control.
What then did it mean to do by including in the Enabling Act
what is now its second sentence? If one begins by recognizing that law-
yers all too often define procedure by its relation to, or in contrast to,
substantive law, we can better understand the language of the Enabling
Act. After stating in the Act that the rules were to regulate "the forms
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and proce-
dure" in civil actions, Congress would naturally wish to clarify the
scope of power granted by further stating, with what must have seemed
then and now to be the best term available, that these rules are not to
create or abridge substantive rights.0 7 Congress, in the first sentence,
listed a number of the matters to be regulated by these rules rather than
simply providing for the prescribing of procedural rules. It follows
therefore that the second sentence would speak only of matters not to
be regulated-that is, Substantive rights rather than substantive rules.
102. Chisholm v. Gilmer, 299 U.S. 99, 102 (1936).
103. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
104. Even under Swift, state statutory law was to be applied in diversity cases, but the applica-
tion of a state statute was not determined by the use of a substantive-procedural distinction. See
id at 18.
105. E. BARRETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 220 (1977).
106. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); see Stem, The Commerce Clause and
the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARv. L. REv. 645, 658 (1946).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
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Viewed in this light the second sentence is not a special insistence on
protection for substantive rights but is instead an attempt to use those
terms as a negative characterization of the rulemaking power to be ex-
ercised. In short, the language of the Enabling Act just as easily sup-
ports the proposition that Congress intended to exercise thereby the
whole of its constitutional power over federal civil procedure.
As the Court stated in Sibbach, the "new policy envisaged in the
enabling act of 1934 was that the whole field of court'procedure be
regulated in the interest of speedy, fair and exact determination of the
truth."'' 0 In that opinion the Court read the first and second sentences
of the Act to stand for the proposition that the Supreme Court was not
to regulate substantive rights in the "guise" of regulating procedure.' 9
In other words, the Court may not under the pretext of prescribing pro-
cedural rules go beyond Congress's constitutional power to provide for
the mechanical process of adjudication in the lower federal courts. The
Court in Sibbach stated that the test under the Act is "whether a rule
really regulates procedure,--the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.""' Moreover,
the Supreme Court stated in Hanna that questions "concerning the
scope of the Enabling Act and the constitutionality of specific Federal
Rules [are to be decided] in light of the distinction set forth in
Sibbach ." 11
Congress, therefore, has attempted through the Enabling Act to
provide for the exercise of its full constitutional power over federal pro-
cedure, including the power to regulate matters or rights which fall
within the "uncertain area between substance and procedure."' I2 One
might argue that if substantive rights can be identified, they are not
within an "uncertain area." The fallacy of this argument lies in the
assumption that in the gray area between substantive and procedural
law, substantive rights can be identified through scientific inquiry with
some degree of unanimity. Professor Ely's article represents perhaps
the most sophisticated attempt to provide such a scientific test; but be-
sides the practical difficulty of application, it also involves subtleties
that would often lead to opposite conclusions. Furthermore, the time
for this inquiry is before a Rule becomes effective. If the potential ef-
fect on an identified substantive right has not been brought to the atten-
108. 312 U.S. at 14.
109. Id at 10. See text accompanying notes 51-53, supra.
110. Id at 14.
111. 380 U.S. at 470-71 (emphasis added).
112. Id at 472.
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tion of the Supreme Court and Congress before this point they would
have acted in that "uncertain" area to promulgate the new Rule. In
other words, a Rule that has survived the multi-step process necessary
for its approval, during which its effects have been considered, should
be presumed valid to the extent of its application under both the Con-
stitution and the Enabling Act unless no rational basis exists for classi-
fying it as a procedural rule." 3
Prior to final approval, a proposed rule can be changed to accom-
modate substantive rights identified as Professor Ely suggests. When
substantive or other policies are protected at this stage from subversion
by a proposed and arguably procedural rule, they can be protected be-
cause of current considerations without the need to refer to limitations
supposedly frozen in place within the Enabling Act. Protection pro-
vided in this way would also not undercut the purposes of the Federal
Rules, and litigants could rely on those Rules so as to efficiently bring
their cases to adjudication on the merits.
Presuming the Rules valid does not result in the sacrifice of sub-
stantive rights because the federal courts can and do refuse to interpret
Rules broadly when to do so would displace otherwise applicable sub-
stantive law." 4 The Supreme Court in Walker stated, however, that
the Rules were not to be interpreted contrary to their plain meaning
and that if a conflict arose between a Rule and state law, the analysis of
Hanna Y. Plumer was to be applied. 1 5 Moreover, many of the Rules
expressly accomodate state law by providing for its control" 6 or by
providing for its use as an alternative means of proceeding." 7
State substantive rights are therefore protected by the Supreme
Court and the Advisory Committee through a process of sensitive
drafting of proposed rules, including participation by the legal profes-
113. See Id; Westen & Lehman, Is There Lifefor Erie after the Death of Diversity? 78 MICH.
L. REV. 311, 364 (1980). *
114. See, e.g., Walker, 446 U.S. at 751 (Rule 3 not a commencement); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (affirmative defenses not created by Rule 8(c)); Arrowsmith v. United Press
Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963) (amenability to service not established by Rule 4(d)(7) or
4(a)); Covel v. Safetech, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 427, 433 (D. Mass. 1981) (application of substantive state
rule more liberal than Rule 15(c)).
115. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9.
116. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2) (service upon an infant or incompetent person in the
manner prescribed by law of state in which service is made); FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (capacity of
individual determined by law of domicile).
117. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7) (service upon individuals or corporations in the manner
prescribed by the law of the state in which district court is held); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (service upon
party not an inhabitant or found within the state in accordance with statute or rule of court of
state in which district court is held); FED. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(4) (deposition before action admissible
if admissible in courts of state where taken); FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e) (service of subpoena according
to statute or rule of court).
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sion and the public; by Congress through the use of its review and veto
power over proposed rules; and by the courts through the enlightened
use of their power of interpretation. To also require that a clearly ap-
plicable Rule be disregarded because of an effect on an arguably sub-
stantive right would amount to a rigid adherence to a concept of states'
rights that is blind to legitimate needs for the efficient and inexpensive
adjudication of actions in federal courts." 8
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR REDRAFTINO RULE 3
SUBSTANTIVE STATE POLICIES-SERVICE AND NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS
A proposed amendment to Rule 3 must, at a minimum, constitute
a rule that would be rationally capable of being characterized as proce-
dural. More precisely, it must be reasonably related to the mechanics
of the judicial process of adjudicating rights and liabilities; then the
proposed Rule would be within Congress's constitutional rulemaking
power and also valid under the Rules Enabling Act. Beyond constitu-
tional and statutory considerations, however, lie the legitimate policy
concerns that will have significance in determining whether any pro-
posed change in the Federal Rules will survive the multi-step process
necessary for approval. Obviously, the primary concern in proposing
to make Rule 3 a commencement provision for purposes of statutes of
limitations is that such a Rule might supplant contrary state com-
mencement provisions representing substantive policy decisions. These
substantive policies therefore must be identified and considered in the
drafting of this proposal.
A. Actions Required of the Plainiff and Their Purposes
State laws regulating commencement of an action for limitations
purposes vary widely in regard to the action required of the plaintiff."I9
118. Cf Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (federalism does not require blind defer-
ence to state's rights).
119. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 3 (1977) (filing of complaint), construed in Ward v. Saben Appliance
Co., 391 So.2d 1030, 1035 (Ala. 1980) (filing of complaint within-limitations period with intent to
have process immediately served); ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 3 (1978) (filing of complaint); Aaiz. R. Civ.
P. 3, 6(0 (1981) (filing of complaint), construedin Murphey v. Valenzuela, 95 Ariz. 30, 32-33, 386
P.2d 78, 80-81 (1963) (filing commences action but failure to use due diligence in obtaining service
may cause abatement); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-301 (1979) (filing complaint and placing summons
in hands of sheriff of proper county); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 350 (Deering 1972) (filing of com-
plaint); COLO. R. Civ. P. 3 (Supp. 1980) (filing a complaint or service of summons); Broderick v.
Jackman, 167 Conn. 96, 98, 355 A.2d 234, 235 (1974) (writ served on defendant); DEL. SUPER. CT.
Civ. P.R. 3(a) (1975) (filing of complaint and praecipe directing issuance of writ), construed in
Russell v. Olmedo, 275 A.2d 249, 250 (Del. 1971) (to commence tolling statute of limitations, must
also diligently seek to bring defendant into court); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-946 (1981) (Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure applicable); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.050 (West 1967) (filing of complaint or
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A large number of states require only the filing of the plaintiff's plead-
petition); GA. CODE ANN. § 81-112 (1956) (repealed for certain purposes by GA. CODE ANN. § 81-
1506 (Supp. 1980)) (filing of petition); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-22 (1976) (issuance of process
with intent it be served); IDAHO CODE § 5-228 (1979) (filing of complaint); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110
13(1) (Smith-Hurd 1968) (filing of complaint); IND. R. TR. P. 3 (Bums 1973) (filing of com-
plaint); IowA R. Civ. P. 48 (Supp. 1981) (filing of complaint); KAN. CIV. PRO. CODE ANN. § 60-
203 and § 61-1703 (Vernon 1976) (filing of petition if service is obtained within 90 days, otherwise
time of service); Ky. REV. STAT. § 413.250 (1972), Ky. R. Civ. P. 3 (1972) (issuance of first sum-
mons or process in good faith); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-5801 (West, Supp. 1981), LA. CODE CIv.
PRoc. ANN. art. 421 (West 1960) (filing of plaintiff's pleading in proper court); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14 § 553 (West 1980), ME. R. CT. 3 (West 1980) (service or filing of complaint, whichever
occurs first); MD. R. PRC. 140 & 170 (1977) (filing of original pleading); MASS. R. Civ. P. 3 (1974)
(filing of complaint and -entry fee); MICH. G. CT. R. 101 (1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5856
(1979), construed in Buscaino v. Rhodes, 385 Mich. 474, 189 N.W.2d 202 (1971) (filing of com-
plaint); MINN. R. Civ. P. 3.01 (1979) (service or delivery of summons to proper officer if service
completed within 60 days); In re Estate of Stanback, 222 So.2d 660, 662-63 (Miss. 1969) (petition
must be presented to clerk with intent summons issue without delay); Mo. R. Civ. P. 53.01
(Vernon 1976) (filing of complaint), construedin Votaw v. Schmittgens, 538 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Mo.
App. 1976) (filing of complaint plus due diligence in obtaining service); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20
(1979), MONT. R. Civ. P. 3 (1979) (filing of complaint); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-217 (1979) (filing of
petition if service obtained within six months); NEV. R. Civ. P. 3 (1979) (filing of complaint);
Clark v. Slayton, 63 N.H. 402, IA. 113 (1885) (filing with intent writ be served); N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:2-
2 (1969), construedin Farrell v. Votator Div. Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 11, 299 A.2d 394 (1973)
(filing of complaint); N.M. R. Civ. P. 3 (1978), construed in Prieto v. Home Educ. Livelihood
Program, 94 N.M. 738, 616 P.2d 1123 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (filing of complaint); N.Y. Civ.
PRAcT. LAW § 203 (a,b) (McKinney 1972) as amended (McKinney Supp. 1981) (service of process
generally); N.C. R. Civ. P. 3 (1969) (filing of complaint or issuance of summons); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01-38 (1974) (service of process or delivery of summons to proper officer with intent it
be served if thereafter within 60 days it is served); N.D.R. Civ. P. 3 (1971) (commence by service
of summons); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.17 (Baldwin 1971), OHIO R. Civ. P. 3 (Baldwin 1971)
(filing of petition and praecipe if service is obtained within one year); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 97 (West Supp. 1981) (service of process or diligent attempt to procure service if service is ob-
tained within 60 days); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.020 (1979) (service of process or filing of complaint if
service is obtained within 60 days); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 1007 (Purdon 1975), PA. R. Civ. P.
§ 1007 (West 1981) (filing a praecipe for writ of summons); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-12 (1970) (filing,
depositing in mail addressed to clerk or delivereol to officer for service), construed in Caprio v.
Fanning & Doorley Constr. Co., 243 A.2d 738 (R.I. 1968) (filing of complaint with due diligence
in seeking service); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-101, 10-401 (Law. Coop. 1976) (service of summons),
construed in First Nat'l Bank v. Hair, 20 S.E.2d 219 (S.C. 1942) (delivery of summons to sheriff
with intent it be served is sufficient); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15-2-30 (1967) (service of sum-
mons); TENN. R. Civ. P. 3 (1981) (filing of complaint with diligence in seeking issuance and serv-
ice); TEX. R. Cirv. P. 22 (Vernon 1981) (filing of petition), construed in Strickland v. Denver City,
559 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (filing plus due diligence in procuring issuance and service
required); UTAH R. Civ. P. 3(a) (1977) (filing or service); VT. R. Civ. P. 3 (1971) (filing a com-
plaint), construed in Weisburgh v. McClure Newspapers, Inc., 396 A.2d 1388 (Vt. 1979) (timely
service must also be accomplished); VA. S. CT. R. 3.33 (1977) (filing of original pleading); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.170 (1971) (filing of complaint or service of summons whichever occurs
first), construed in Fox v. Groff, 16 Wash. App. 893, 559 P.2d 1376 (3d Div. 1977) (filing is suffi-
dent only when service is subsequently effected within the statutory period and within 90 days of
such filing); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 3 (1978) (filing of complaint); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.02(1) (West
1981) (filing of summons and complaint if service is obtained within 60 days); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 3
(1979) (filing of complaint if service is obtained within 60 days, otherwise when service is
obtained).
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ing or filing followed by due diligence in seeking to obtain service.
Some states require filing plus the issuance of summons with intent it
be served and others require filing plus service of process. A number of
states do not require that filing precede service and may therefore re-
quire either filing or service to commence an action. Filing may also be
deemed the act of commencement only when service is obtained within
a set period thereafter. At least twelve states require service within a
calculable period, and a substantial number of others put emphasis on
the use of diligence in obtaining service on the defendant in order to
properly commence an action.
Since a commencement provision plays a significant role in the
application of the state's statute of limitations, the policies it promotes
must be ascertained by reference to the part it plays in the whole of the
state's limitations policy. 120 It has been said that the primary purpose
of a statute of limitations is to protect defendants. 2' A statute of limi-
tations is, in this sense, a legislative decision that after the specified
period a defendant should be able to assume he is free of liability and
should not thereafter be required to muster his defenses. The limita-
tions period is also, at least in part, a recognition that after a certain
time evidence may have been lost to the defendant because of the fad-
ing of memories or the disappearance of witnesses.'2 2 Moreover, by
120. Determining when a particular provision is an "integral" part of a state's limitations pol-
icy is also a matter of some difficulty for the plaintiff in federal court. Prior to the Walker decision
the lower federal courts had looked to a variety of factors to determine whether a commencement
provision was an integral part of a state statute of limitations. The federal courts have looked to
language in state court decisions on this issue, see Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d
1118, 1122 (10th Cir. 1979); Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F.2d 947, 951 (8th Cir.
1973); whether the provision was contained in the same article or chapter as the statute of limita-
tions, as opposed to being part of the state's rules of procedure, see Chappell v. Rouch, 448 F.2d
446, 449-50 (10th Cir. 1971); whether the provision specifically referred to the statute of limita-
tions, see 592 F.2d at 1122; 448 F.2d at 449-50; or whether the provision served other purposes in
addition to regulating compliance with statutes of limitations, see 480 F.2d at 951-52; Chladek v.
Stems Transp. Co., 427 F. Supp. 270, 274 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Schinker v. Ruud Mfg. Co., 386 F.
Supp. 626, 632 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
In Walker the Supreme Court looked to whether the applicable state provision (requiring
service of process) promoted the purposes of the statute of limitations. See Walker, 446 U.S. at
75 1. "It is these policy aspects which make the service requirement an 'integral' part of the statute
of limitations .... " Id at 751-52. Therefore, the factors considered significant by the lower
courts would be relevant primarily to the choice between state provisions such as when there is
one general and one specific provision. When one state provision exists which is enforced by state
courts for limitations purposes, the policies reflected by that provision must be considered regard-
less of whether it is described as integral, is a general civil rule, or has other purposes. See 2 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 3,07 [4.-3-11, at 3-95 (1981).
121. See generally Developments, supra note 19, at 1185.
122. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980); American Pipe & Constr. Co.
v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974); Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
setting a time limit the legislature may well have considered the likeli-
hood that in adjudicating claims brought after that limit a court would
have difficulty in accurately determining fact issues because of the un-
availability of evidence.
B. Actual Notice-The Underlying Purpose of the
Service Requirement
A commencement provision that requires service on the defendant
within a specified period directly promotes these limitations policies.
123
Such a provision requires timely notice so as to alert the defendant to
the need for preserving evidence and thereby promotes the purpose of
protecting the judicial fact-finding process.' 2" A requirement of service
within a set or calculable period also provides the potential defendant a
tool by which he can accurately calculate the deadline after which he
may have peace of mind. 25 After that deadline he can assume his lia-
bility under that claim has evaporated and thus allocate his resouces to
needs other than his legal defense in court. Professor Ely has identified
this latter purpose of a service requirement as nonprocedural and
therefore substantive in that it is not related to the conduct of litiga-
tion.' 26 A requirement that the defendant be notified of suit within a
calculable period also appears nonprocedural when characterized ac-
cording to the expectations it engenders. Furthermore, consideration
123. 7 Tomanlo, 446 U.S. at 487.
124. In Walker, the United States Supreme Court, in applying the refined outcome-determina-
tive test of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 466-68, held that a service requirement was substantive
in the Erie sense. Walker, 446 U.S. at 752-53. Upon analysis the Court's reasoning proceeded as
follows: (1) Rule 3 does not apply, therefore, Erie does; (2) State statutes of limitations are to be
applied under Erie-York; (3) the Oklahoma Service requirement is an integral part of that state's
statute of limitations and this suit would be barred in Oklahoma courts; therefore (4) to allow the
cause to proceed in federal court would perhaps not promote forum shopping, but would consti-
tute an inequitable administration of the law. One might wonder why a state-enforced require-
ment of filing plus issuance of the summons (but not service) would not be part and parcel of the
state's statute of limitations even though it did not promote limitations policies. A response is that
such a requirement would not be outcome-determinative under Hanna since failure to apply it
would not promote forum shopping or constitute the inequitable administration of law-to the
defendant's detriment. When the Court in Walker found the Oklahoma provision was an integral
part of the statute of limitations by noting that it promoted limitations policies, it perhaps was
accomplishing two purposes at once--showing that this provision was substantive not procedural
to distinguish Rule 3 and demonstrating that the failure to apply it would be outcome-determina-
tive. It should be noted that in the absence of an applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure even
a clearly procedural state rule might be applicable under the Hanna outcome-determinative test.
See Ely, supra note 42, at 721.
125. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 751 n.12.
126. See Ely, supra note 42, at 730-31. It might appear that such a requirement is substantive
because it is part of the measurement of the life of a substantive claim. Any commencement
provision, however, becomes a part of the measurement of a claim's life if it is applied. The
question is whether it should be applied.
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of the deadline leads a potential defendant to think in terms of freedom
from suit rather than in terms of defense in court.
The Supreme Court in Walker concluded that, in contrast to Rule
3, the Oklahoma requirement of service applied in that case was a
"statement of a substantive decision by that State."1 27 The Court
found Rule 3 inapplicable and proceeded to hold that the state rule
must, under Erie, be applied because failure to do so would constitute
the inequitable administration of law.1 28 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court noted that this service requirement furthers the policy deci-
sion that each defendant has a "legitimate right not to be surprised by
notice of a law-suit" after the limitations period.' 29 The Court also
noted that this notice policy was further evidenced by Oklahoma's al-
lowance of commencement as to defendants "united in interest" with
other defendants who had received timely service. 130 Such a defendant
would presumably have received actual notice of the lawsuit through a
related co-defendant who had received timely service and would
thereby have his peace of mind disturbed within the limitations period.
Such a defendant would have knowledge, although received through
informal means, within the period the state deems it feasible for him to
gather and preserve his evidence. 3'
Without straining the Court's reasoning it can be said that actual
notice is, in reality, the state's goal. The requirement of service to pro-
vide notice is merely a means of assuring that it is received. Actual
notice of suit when received, through whatever means, within the pe-
riod prescribed by state law effectively serves the purposes of a statute
of limitations. Had the Court in Walker been presented with a conflict
between the Oklahoma service requirement and a federal judge-made
rule that filing plus actual notice, even though informally conveyed,
satisfies a statute of limitations, it would not have been justified in con-
cluding that the choice of that federal rule would have constituted the
inequitable administration of law. The goal of both rules would be
identical and only the means applied for achieving that goal would dif-
fer. When the goal of both federal and state rules was giving actual
notice, differences in the manner or means of serving process was not
deemed determinative by the Court in Hanna. 3 2 It is, of course, not
the identification of a rule as a means to an end that is decisive; it is the
127. Walker, 446 U.S. at 751.
128. Id at 753.
129. Id at 751 n.12.
130. Id at 752 n.12.
131. See id
132. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The court in Hanna noted the common goal of the conflicting rules,
see id at 462 n. 1, and went on in its considered dictum to conclude that such a variance would not
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recognition that this hypothetical federal rule would fully serve the
same policies promoted by the state rule. The state rule does provide
the additional "right" to transmission of notice by formal service of
process. The only purpose for requiring service of process in addition
to actual notice, however, is to remove questions about the receipt or
sufficiency of that notice from state court consideration. If the rule was
that the defendant need only be given, through any means, information
sufficient to alert him within the limitations period of the filing of suit,
the court would be required to determine that the information was re-
ceived in time and was sufficient. To go further and require service of
process removes the need for the court to determine these issues; it need
only determine the timeliness of service. The state policy represented
by the requirement of service rather than only actual notice is always,
in a sense, served when those questions as to timeliness and sufficiency
of notice are to be determined by a federal not a state court. This anal-
ysis is another way of showing that a service requirement of a state
commencement provision is related only to the manner of giving notice
and is, therefore, purely procedural in nature. 133
Applying Professor Ely's test we can say that the only non-
procedural right provided a defendant by a state service requirement is
the right to actual notice within the period prescribed by state law. 134
Should the defendant receive sufficient notice, even though transmitted
informally, he cannot legitimately enjoy peace of mind and would also
be alerted to the need to gather and preserve his defensive evidence.
All of the potentially substantive policies of a statute of limitations are
served when the defendant is given sufficient information of the filing
of the suit within the limitations period.'35
On the other hand, a state provision that does not require some
sort of notice within the limitations period or a set period thereafter
fails to directly promote any of the policies of a statute of limitations.
This type of provision instead represents a decision to protect plaintiffs
from limitations problems arising in court by allowing commencement
of a suit through steps that can be taken rapidly and over which plain-
constitute the unfair discrimination against citizens of the forum state with which Erie was con-
cerned. See id at 468 n.9, 469.
133. The defendant, of course, will claim his right to service, but this is nothing more than a
claim to have everything as it would be in state court. The question under Erie is not whether
litigation in federal court varies from what it would have been in state court, but whether there is
good reason in the Erie sense for not allowing certain variances. See 380 U.S. at 468.
134. See Ely, supra note 42, at 731. Professor Ely in discussing Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), made the point that the difference in that case, between
Rule 3 and a state service requirement, was a difference between notice and no notice. Id at 731
n.203. There would be no such difference in the hypothetical presented.
135. See 414 U.S. at 554-55.
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tiff has greater control. Without a requirement of notice to the defend-
ant he is not alerted within a prescribed period to the need for
preserving evidence and this may work to impair the accuracy of the
judicial fact-finding process. Moreover, without such a requirement a
potential defendant has no deadline after which he can legitimately
have peace of mind.' 36 In short, any commencement provision not re-
quiring notice within a set period must be seen as exclusively con-
cerned with the maintenance and management of litigation and thereby
as serving only procedural goals.
137
The provision that informally-transmitted notice to the defendant
will satisfy a statute of limitations is not without analogue in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules provides
for the relation back of an amended complaint, when adding a defend-
ant, to the date of the original so as to avoid the limitations defense of
that defendant. Relation back is allowed when the claim stated in both
the original and amended pleadings arose from the same transaction or
occurrence and, within the limitations period, the added defendant re-
ceived such notice of the institution of the action that he would not be
prejudiced in defending on the merits and knew or should have known
that but for a mistake he would have been named as a defendant. 138
Rule 15(c) has been applied in diversity actions and has not been seen
to deprive defendants of state substantive rights or of any procedural
due process right. '3
136. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 751:
[A]ctual notice by the defendant is an integral part of the several policies served by the
statute of limitations (citations omitted). The statute of limitations establishes a deadline
after which the defendant may legitimately have peace of mind; it also recognizes that
after a certain period of time it is unfair to require the defendant to attempt to piece
together his defense to an old claim.
137. See Ely, supra note 42, at 726.
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
Relation Back of.Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended plead-
ing arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amend-
ment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is
satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party
to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he
will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have
been brought against him.
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or his designee, or the
Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or officer who would have been a proper
defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with respect to the
United States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a defendant.
139. See Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1978); Skidmore v. Syntex Laborato-
ries, Inc., 529 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir. 1976); Loudenslager v. Teeple, 466 F.2d 249, 250 (3d Cir.
1972); Crowder v. Gordons Transps., Inc., 387 F.2d 413, 415-18 (8th Cir. 1967). See generally
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C. Should Rule 3 Require Formal Service or Only Notice?
A proposal that Rule 3 be amended to expressly impose either a
service or a notice requirement for all limitations purposes would both
alert plaintiffs to the need to take action beyond filing and preserve any
state policy that could be legitimately identified as substantive. Such a
Rule would, however, conffict with the commencement rule that has
been applied for purposes of federal statutes of limitations in a majority
of the federal circuits. I ° In Moore v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gas
Co. ,"4' the court held that filing the complaint alone commenced an
action for purposes of the four-year statute of limitations for federal
anti-trust actions. In so doing the court found Rule 3 clearly stated that
only filing was required.' 42 Further justification for the court's holding
was found in the legislative history of that federal statute of limitations
and in the fact that Congress had enacted that statute subsequent to the
adoption of the Rules.1 43 This latter fact indicated to the court that
Congress had known of the definition of commencement in Rule 3
when it provided for the barring of an anti-trust action unless "com-
menced" within four years.l'"
The assumption that Rule 3 applies as a commencement provision
for federal limitations purposes is subject to serious doubt since the
decision in Walker. In that case, the Court held that Rule 3 was not
intended to toll a state statute of limitations but was meant to govern
the date from which various time periods required by other Rules be-
gan. 45 As has been noted, the Court expressly reserved the question
whether Rule 3 was a commencement provision for federal statutes of
limitations,"6 but its holding raises doubts as to the Rule's controlling
effect in that regard. Assuming Rule 3 as it presently exists is not a
commencement provision for any statute of limitations does not, how-
ever, compel the conclusion that the decision in Moore was wrong.
The alternative basis for the decision is that Congress, by using the
Note, Note.- Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(c): Relation Back of Amendments, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 83, 99-100 (1972); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 55, § 1498, 507.
140. See Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1980);
Caldwell v. Martin Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Wahl,
583 F.2d 285, 288-89 (6th Cir. 1978); Metropolitan Paving Co. v. International Union of Operat-
ing Eng'rs., 439 F.2d 300, 306 (10th Cir. 1971); Moore Co. v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline
Co., 347 F.2d 921, 922-23 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 925 (1966); Hoffman v. Halden,
268 F.2d 280, 302 (9th Cir. 1959); Messenger v. United States, 231 F.2d 328, 329 (2d Cir. 1956).
141. 347 F.2d 921 (8th Cir. 1965).
142. Id at 922.
143. Id at 925.
144. See 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976).
145. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51.
146. Id at 751 n. 11. See text accompanying notes 5-6, supra.
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word "commencement" in a federal statute of limitations, intended to
absorb the definition provided by Rule 3; therefore, even if Rule 3 does
not itself operate as a commencement provision, a federal statute of
limitations can still be interpreted to require only the filing of the com-
plaint. Many federal statutes of limitations, in fact, do speak in terms
of commencement147 and, in addition, section 2415 of the Judicial
Code provides that every action for money damages brought by the
United States founded on any contract is barred "unless the complaint
is filed within six years."'' 48
A federal statute of limitations can, of course, create substantive
rights under Professor Ely's test just as state statutes do. 14 9 The ques-
tion is, however, whether a particular commencement provision pro-
motes the substantive purposes of that statute. 50  As previously
mentioned, a commencement provision that does not require notice to
defendant within a prescribed period cannot be seen to further such
purposes.' 5' Therefore such a provision in a federal statute of limita-
tions would not be substantive in this sense, and an amended Rule 3
which required service or notice for limitations purposes would per-
haps supersede a federal statute of limitations in that respect. 52 The
Enabling Act states in this regard that all laws in conflict with the Fed-
eral Rules shall be of no further force or effect.' 53
Even though the requirement of only filing does not implicate sub-
stantive rights, Congress, if it had any purpose in mind, might well
have established that requirement as part of the overall purpose of the
related substantive right. It should be noted here that federal statutes
147. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C.A. § 763a (Supp. 1981) (death on high seas); 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1976)
(admiralty suits against United States); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976) (age discrimination in employ-
ment actions); 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976) (actions and prosecutions to enforce antitrust laws).
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1976). It is difficult to conclude that this particularized require-
ment evidences a congressional understanding that commencement requires more than filing. The
explicit requirement of filing might have been included without any intent to distinguish filing
from commencement or, indeed, without awareness of any distinction.
149. See Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38 (1926). A provision relating to commencement
contained in such a federal statute can also be said to be interrelated with value judgments under-
lying that statute. See TOmanio, 446 U.S. at 487-88; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
150. See 414 U.S. at 558 n.29.
151. See note 137 and accompanying text, supra.
152. In dissenting from the proposal of amendments to the Rules adopted in 1963, Justices
Black and Douglas stated:
We believe that while some of the Rules of Civil Procedure are simply housekeeping
details, many determine matters so substantially affecting the rights of litigants in law-
suits that in practical effect they are the equivalent of new legislation which, in our judg-
ment, the Constitution requires to be initiated in and enacted by the Congress and
approved by the President.
Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, 374 U.S. 865, 865-66 (1963).
153. See 28 U.S.C. '§ 2072 (1976).
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of limitations are specially related to particular claims created by Acts
of Congress. To establish a rigid requirement for commencement in the
Rules would, therefore, restrict Congress's freedom in the structuring of
the rights and remedies it creates. The Supreme Court has indicated
that the overall policies of related federal rights should be carefully
considered in the application of a federal statute of limitations. Thus,
the decision to toll a federal statute of limitations is not to be deter-
mined by characterizing the matter as substantive or procedural but by
asking whether the overall congressional purpose is effectuated by toll-
ing the federal statute of limitations under the circumstances of a par-
ticular case."'
A proposal to amend Rule 3 to make it a commencement provi-
sion requiring actual notice or service in all instances would be within
the constitutional and statutory rule-making power but would be un-
duly restrictive of Congress's freedom to structure the remedial nature
of federal substantive rights. This conclusion assumes that the Rule
would supersede prior congressional decisions, but this assumption is
dubious. The effect on congressional decisions related to substantive
federal rights appears sufficient alone to avoid a rigid requirement of
service or notice.' 55 Because of these consequences both the Supreme
Court and Congress would have legitimate reason to believe such a
proposal would be unwise.
V. PROPOSAL FOR AMENDING RULE 3
A. The Proposed Amended Rule-Text and Explanation
Rule 3
Commencement of Action
A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. A
statute of limitations shall not be deemed a bar/or/falure to bring an
action in a timelfashion y, within theperiod allowed by the applicable
lawfor service ofprocess, the de/endant has instead received such notice
of thefiling of the complaint that he will not be prejudiced in maintain-
ing his deense on the merits.
1. The existing language of Rule 3 is retained so that the definition of
commencement thereby provided will remain unchanged. "Com-
mencement" is not used in the proposed amendment to Rule 3 so that
the change would neither directly nor indirectly disturb existing inter-
pretations of that word as used in federal statutes of limitations. More-
154. 414 U.S. at 557-58; Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 426-27, 427 n.2 (1965).
155. The purposes of the proposal are to give sufficient warning to plaintiffs and to protect
them from loss of claims due to purely technical defects. Displacement of all other commence-
ment rules is not necessary.
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over, the time of commencement is significant in determining the
existence of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, in determining resi-
dence for venue purposes, in setting a beginning point for periods es-
tablished in other of the Rules, and in determining priority between
concurrent actions.15 6
2. A statute of limitations shall not be deemed a barfor failure to bring
an action in a timely fashion
The proposed amendment states only an affirmative proposition-
that if the following condition is satisfied, a statute of limitations will
not bar an action. The amendment does not state the negative proposi-
tion that in order to satisfy any statute of limitations the following con-
dition must be satisfied.'" If the applicable law requires only filing,
the plaintiff can simply satisfy that requirement.
3. . . f, within the period allowed by the applicable law for service of
process, .
The amendment is to provide a method by which plaintiff can sat-
isfy any applicable statute of limitations. It would apply even when a
state commencement provision required issuance of summons but not
service within the limitations period. That state would necessarily "al-
low" service at a later time, and the failure of plaintiff to obtain issu-
ance of summons would not be significant--only his failure to give
notice within the period allowed for service. Nothing in the Rule
would restrict a federal court from exercising its inherent power to clear
the docket of cases for want of prosecution should inordinate delay be
caused. The period is not described as the "limitations" period because
that description could be interpreted to exclude those periods in addi-
tion to the limitations period in which service may be completed.' 58
4. . . . the defendant has instead received such notice of thefiling of the
complaint that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the
merits.
Informal notice received by the defendant would be allowed as an
alternative method for complying with statutes of limitations. Notice
need only be received by defendant, not necessarily transmitted by
156. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 55, § 1051, at 165-66.
157. This approach is taken from the analysis applied by Judge Keeton in Covel v. Safetech,
Inc., 90 F.R.D. 427, 432-33 (D. Mass. 1981) to determine that Rule 15(c), providing for relation
back of amendments, did not prohibit the allowance of relation back under a more liberal state
rule in a diversity case.
158. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 97 (1971) (allowing completion of service within 60 days
after filing if filing and an "attempt" to serve occur within the limitations period). Compare In-
gram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1978) (the "period provided by law for commencing
the action" language of Federal Rule 15(c) includes the time after the limitations period in which
service is allowed) with Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d 133, 136-37 (7th Cir. 1973) (Rule 15(c)
requires notice within the limitations period). See aso Note, supra note 139, at 105-06,
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plaintiff. The information received by defendant must, however, be in
regard to the filing of the complaint; notice of the existence of a claim
and the likelihood of a lawsuit is not sufficient. If this latter type of
notice was allowed, the defendant's right to determine with certainty
the end of his liability would be affected; and, thus, the substantive
right to breathe easy, engendered by a service requirement, would be
modified or abridged. A court might be prompted, by concentrating
solely on "notice of filing," to require particularized information be-
yond what was necessary to inform defendant of the institution of the
suit and the nature of the claim, but the subsequent language is in-
cluded to control the court's consideration of the nature of the informa-
tion received. By requiring notice that is sufficient to prevent prejudice
to defendant's efforts to defend himself, one of the identified purposes
of a statute of limitations is promoted. The requirement of notice also
promotes the primary purpose of such a statute-fairness to defend-
ant-in that he is assured of notice of suit, albeit informal, within the
period allowed for service of process.
B. Commentary on the Proposed Rule
Rule 3, with the proposed amendment, would alert a plaintiff to
the possibility that action beyond filing is required and would cause
him to investigate further to discover the applicable law. The difficulty
in determining whether the applicable state law required service would
still exist, but through a quick reading of the Rule the plaintiff would
know that complete safety could be achieved by filing the complaint
and giving informal notice to the defendant within the limitations pe-
riod. Misinterpretation of the "period allowed by law"language would
most likely lead to the conclusion that it referred to the limitations pe-
riod alone. Finding the applicable limitations provision would be less
difficult than finding the applicable commencement provision and ac-
tion on the basis of this misinterpretation would protect, not harm, the
plaintiff.
The "notice" language of the proposal is taken largely from Rule
15(c)(1) of the Federal Rules. Rule 15(c) deals with the relation back
of amendments that change the party against whom a claim is asserted
and is carefully designed to bring about the fair adjudication of rights
and obligations without disturbing the substantive rights of defend-
ants. 5 9 It has been held valid and applicable in diversity cases even in
159. See text of Rule 15(c), FED. R. Crv. P., supra note 138. For example, if plaintiff incor-
rectly names a particular person as the defendant and then after the limitations period has expired
seeks to correct his error by naming the real defendant in an amended complaint, the amendment-
added defendant will not be able to successfully assert the limitations defense if the conditions of
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the face of more restrictive state rules.' 6
As the law presently exists, a defendant added by an amendment
after the limitations period could not successfully assert a limitations
defense if he had received sufficient informal notice within that pe-
riod. 6" This would be the result even if state law required service of
process within the limitations period as to originally-named defend-
ants. "'62 The effect of Rule 15(c), therefore, is to deprive the amend-
ment-added defendant of his state right to service of process within
the limitations period while preserving his right to receive information
within the period sufficient to alert him to the need for preserving his
defensive evidence and, of course, sufficient to inform him that he had
been sued. Had this defendant been named in the original complaint
but not given service of process within the required period, he would be
allowed to interpose his limitations defense even though, within that
period, he had full knowledge of the filing of the complaint such that
he would not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense. 63
The Supreme Court did not consider the significance of informal
notice in Walker but it did state that the case was indistinguishable
Rule 15(c) are satisfied. Under these circumstances the amendment is said to relate back to the
date of the original pleading in that the action stated in the amendment will be deemed to have
been commenced when the action was initially instituted. Because the effect of Rule 15(c) is to
deny a limitations defense to this added defendant, relation back is allowed only when the policies
of a statute of limitations are served-when that defendant receives sufficient and timely notice of
the original action knowing that but for a mistake he would have been named. To do otherwise, as
the Advisory Committee's notes to the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c) state, would be to "defeat
unjustly the claimant's opportunity to prove his case." 39 F.R.D. 69, 83 (1966) (advisory commit-
tee notes); see Western & Lehman, supra note 113, at 363-64.
160. See, eg., Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 612 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. dmissed,
448 U.S. 911 (1980); Britt v. Arvanitis, 590 F.2d 57, 60-61 (3d Cir. 1978); Ingram v. Kumar, 585
F.2d 566, 570 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d
133, 136 (7th Cir. 1973); Welch v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 466 F.2d 1344, 1345 (5th Cir.
1972). See generally 380 U.S. at 473.
161. The notice received by the added defendant need not be formally transmitted. 39 F.R.D.
69, 82-3 (1966) (advisory committee notes); Haworth, Changing Dofendants In Private CivilActions
under Federal Rude 13(c)-An Ancient Problem Lingers On, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 552, 572. Some
commentators have discussed "informality" without clearly distinguishing between the means of
giving or acquiring information and the nature of the information received, that is, whether de-
fendant knew of a particular lawsuit or only of the likelihood of future filing. See 6 C. WaioHr &
A. MILLER, supra note 55, § 1498, at 507-11; Note, supra note 139, at 96-100.
If the notice required under Rule 15(c)(1) must be transmitted formally, that is, through serv-
ice of process on the added defendant, the rule would have no remedial effect whatsoever. Rule
15(c) would, under these circumstances, have the effect of imposing the more onerous burden of
service of process even when not required as to an original defendant. This was clearly not meant
to be the purpose of this provision. See 39 F.R.D. 69, 82-83 (1966) (advisory committee notes).
162. (y. Note, supra note 139, at 126-27.
163. In this case neither Rule 3 (because of Walker) nor Rule 15(c) (because by its terms it
applies only to defendants added by amendment) would apply.
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from Ragan.'" In the court of appeals opinion in Ragan,'65 it is noted
the plaintiff had not only filed his complaint within the two-year state
limitations period but had also within that period secured service on
one Clarence M. Trent in the offices of the defendant. This service was
quashed, however, because the marshall in serving Trent, who was not
an officer or registered agent of the corporation, had failed to exercise
due diligence in ascertaining whether officers of the corporation could
be found before he left the summons at the offices of the corporation.
Since an alias summons was served after the period in which service
was required, the court held the state statute of limitations barred
plaintiff's action.'66 This decision was upheld by the Supreme
Court.167 As a consequence, a plaintiff who investigated his case to find
out who the proper defendant was and where it was located suffered
the loss of his claim because of the lack of diligence of the marshall, not
because of his own lack of diligence in seeking service of process. It
seems certain that Merchants Transfer & Warehouse company did re-
ceive actual notice within the limitations period but was allowed to es-
cape liability by virtue of a pure technicality.' 68
The proposed amendment would prevent this unfair result and
also make more consistent the treatment of original and amendment-
added defendants. 6" A plaintiff would also be less vulnerable to mys-
terious state laws, elusive defendants, and less than adequate process-
servers since he could take quick action on his own to preserve his
claim by filing the complaint and then, perhaps, placing a telephone
call to the defendant or his attorney. Assuming an attorney has been
representing the defendant's interests in regard to that claim, he would
be the person in the best position to take action to preserve defensive
evidence and could be relied on to notify defendant of this develop-
ment. Notice provided the attorney of a defendant added by an
amendment has been imputed to that defendant to satisfy Rule 15(c)
164. Walker, 466 U.S. at 748.
165. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Ragan, 170 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1948).
166. Id at 992-93.
167. 337 U.S. at 534.
168. The original summons was served on September 22, 1945, and the statute of limitations
expired on October 1, 1945. The company filed its motion to quash this summons on October 12,
1945. See 170 F.2d at 989.
169. Inconsistency that would not be corrected arises in those jurisdictions in which filing is
alone sufficient to commence an action for limitations purposes. Here, because Rule 15(c) re-
quires notice be received within the period for "commencing the action," an amendment-added
defendant has to receive notice within the limitations period while notice to an originally-named
defendant can be received after that period. See 585 F.2d at 571. The suggestion of some com-
mentators is to amend Rule 15(c) so that notice is sufficient if received within the period allowed
for service of process. See Haworth, supra note 161, at 564; Note, supra note 139, at 133.
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and therefore avoid a limitations bar.' 70
Service of process is, of course, the act by which a court asserts its
jurisdiction to adjudicate the interests of the defendant. Aside from
questions of amenability to service, the Due Process Clause requires, as
a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction, sufficient notice to defend-
ant so that he will have a meaningful opportunity to appear and defend
himself.'7' The notice required to satisfy due process is that which is
reasonably certain to inform the defendant of the pendency of the ac-
tion. 7 2 For purposes of assuring due process, some adequate form of
service is, of course, ultimately required, but the purposes served
thereby are different from the purposes served by a statute of limita-
tions. Actual notice within the limitations period provides the defend-
ant sufficient information to alert him to the fact of suit and the need to
preserve evidence while formal service of process required at some later
point but before adjudication of the defendant's interests assures him of
a meaningful opportunity to appear and defend himself.'
73
VI. CONCLUSION
As I review this article I cannot put aside the concern that some-
thing more should be said to clarify, explain, or persuade. When, how-
ever, I look back to the twelve lonely words presently contained in the
object of all this, it seems perhaps enough has been said. My perora-
tion is therefore brief.
Nothing beyond inertia appears to justify continuing the trap in-
herent in the present existence of Rule 3. This Rule should be changed
so that it, like the other Rules, may be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action on the merits.
170. See Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1980); Montalvo v. Tower Life
Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135, 1147 (5th Cir. 1970); Snodgrass v. Roberts Dairy Co., 82 F.R.D. 626, 631-32
(D. Neb. 1979); Washington v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 324 F. Supp. 849, 853 (W.D. La. 1971).
171. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
172. Id
173. The issues also arise at different times and, when decided, have different consequences
for the defendant. Due process notice questions are most often critical when a judgment has been
entered against a defendant who has not appeared. Such rights can be asserted long after the
judgment has been entered and often even in a different jurisdiction. Under these circumstances,
proof of actual notice could be exceedingly difficult. Moreover, a decision on this issue may estab-
lish the ultimate liability of the defendant. Assertion of a limitations defense, on the other hand,
must be part of the process of adjudicating the merits, more contemporaneous with the acts alleg-
edly establishing notice, and the decision on that defense, though important, cannot establish the
defendant's liability on the merits. There is, therefore, a distinct need for protecting the defend-
ant's due process right to appear by requiring formal service of process since that procedure pro-
vides evidence of notice for the record.
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APPENDIX
The following are reported decisions by federal courts in which
one matter considered was the role of Rule 3 in regard to a statute of
limitations. The decisions are broadly divided into cases based on di-
versity of citizenship jurisdiction and those brought on other bases of
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Special attention was given diver-
sity jurisdiction because considerations of federalism are to a greater
degree implicated in such cases and because this division facilitated
research.
,SUMMARY
I. Decisions in cases based on diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction. 102
A. From the effective date of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to the date of the decision in Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949).
[September 16, 1938 to June 20, 1949] 11
B. From the date of the Ragan decision to the date of the
decision inHanna v. P/umer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
[June 20, 1949 to April 26, 1965] 38
C. From the date of the Hanna decision to the date of the
decision in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740
(1980).
[April 26, 1965 to June 2, 1980] 46
ID. From the date of the Walker decision to the date of the
last decision discovered.
[June 2, 1980 to June 5, 1981] 7
II. Decisions in cases brought on other bases of federal
subject matter jurisdiction.
[1938 through 1980] 100
TOTAL 202
CASES
I. Decisions in cases based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
A. From the effective date of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to the date of the decision in Ragan v. Merchants Trans-
fer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
[September 16, 1938 to June 20, 1949]
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1. Courts of Appeals
Zuckerman v. McCulley, 170 F.2d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir.
1948).
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Ragan, 170 F.2d
987, 991-92 (10th Cir. 1948).
Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26, 28 (10th Cir. 1944).
Hackner v. Guar. Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95, 98-99 (2d Cir.
1941).
2. District Courts
Stauffer v. McLain Trucking, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 478, 478-79
(N.D. Ohio 1948).
Blum v. Postal Tel., Inc., 60 F. Supp. 237, 238 (W.D. Pa.
1945).
Yudin v. Carroll, 57 F. Supp. 793, 798-99 (W.D. Ark.
1944).
International Pulp Equi. Co. v. St. Regis Kraft Co., 55 F.
Supp. 860, 861 (D. Del. 1944).
Mealy v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 2 F.R.D. 339, 339 (E.D.N.Y.
1942).
Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660, 661 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
Gallagher v. Carroll, 27 F. Supp. 568, 570 (E.D.N.Y.
1939).
B. From the date of the Ragan decision to the date of the
decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
[June 20, 1949 to April 26, 1965]
1. Courts of Appeals
Chicago, AI. & P. AA v. Stude, 204 F.2d 954, 956 (8th
Cir. 1953).
Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949, 951-52 (2d
Cir. 1950).
2. District Courts
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp.
913, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Callan v. Lillybelle, Ltd, 234 F. Supp. 773, 776-77 (D.N.J.
1964), citing with approval Ackerley v. Commercial Credit
Co., 111 F. Supp. 92, 95-96 (D.N.J. 1953).
Harrison v. Kovats, 224 F. Supp. 581, 583 (W.D.S.C.
1963).
W' T Burton, Inc. Y. Reed Roller Bit Co., 214 F. Supp.
84, 86 (W.D. La. 1963).
Rios v. Drennan, 209 F. Supp. 927, 928 (E.D.N.C. 1962).
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Mahan v. Ohio Auto Rentals Co., 207 F. Supp. 383, 384
(S.D. Ohio 1962).
Netermyer v. Henley, 205 F. Supp. 734, 735-36 (N.D. Ind.
1962).
Jozwiak v. Dayton Oil Co., 200 F. Supp. 300, 302
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Westerman v. Grow, 198 F. Supp. 309, 309 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
Norwood v. Lineberger-Bergen, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 127, 129
(W.D.N.C. 1961).
Burkhardt v. Bates, 191 F. Supp. 149, 151 (N.D. Iowa
1961).
Skilling v. Funk Aircraft Co., 173 F. Supp. 939, 943 (W.D.
Mo. 1959).
Johansson v. Towson, 177 F. Supp. 729, 732 (D. Ga. 1959).
L. G. Defelice & Son, Inc. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 23
F.R.D. 275, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Kieffer v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 398, 401 (D.
Md. 1958).
Jack v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.R.D. 318, 319 (E.D. Mich.
1958).
Lorraine Motors, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 166 F.
Supp. 319, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
Decker v. Boyle, 162 F. Supp. 164, 166 (W.D.N.Y. 1957).
Hagy v. Allen, 153 F. Supp. 302, 304-05 (E.D. Ky. 1957).
Hixon v. Highsmith, 147 F. Supp. 801, 802-03 (E.D. Tenn.
1957).
Cahill v. St. Mary's Hosp., 20 F.R.D. 103, 104 (E.D.N.Y.
1956).
Wagner v. New York, Ont. & W Ry., 146 F. Supp. 926,
928-29 & n.2 (M.D. Pa. 1956).
General Elec. Co. v. Central Transit Warehouse Co., 127 F.
Supp. 817, 824 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Reisinger v. Cannon, 127 F. Supp. 50, 51 (D. Conn. 1954).
Lanigan v. Boston Terminal Corp., 112 F. Supp. 957, 957
(D. Mass. 1953).
Ackerley v. Commercial Credit Co., 111 F. Supp. 92, 95-96
(D.N.J. 1953).
Macri v. Flaherty, 115 F. Supp. 739, 743 (E.D.S.C. 1953).
West v. Cincinnati N.O. & TP. Ry., 108 F. Supp. 276, 278
(E.D. Tenn. 1952).
Myers v. Slotkin, 13 F.R.D. 191, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
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Rogers v. Halford, 107 F. Supp. 295, 296 (E.D. Wis. 1952).
Glebus v. Filmore, 104 F. Supp. 902, 903 (D. Conn. 1952).
Burns v. Chubb, 99 F. Supp. 581, 582 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
Masterpiece Prod, Inc. v. UnitedArtists Corp., 90 F. Supp.
750, 751 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
McCarley v. Foster-Milburn, 89 F. Supp. 643, 645
(W.D.N.Y. 1950).
Otto v. Hirl, 89 F. Supp. 72, 74 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
Nola Elec. Co. v. Reilly, 93 F. Supp. 164, 169 (S.D.N.Y.
1948).
C. From the date of the Hanna decision to the date of the
decision in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
[April 26, 1965 to June 2, 1980]
1. Courts of Appeals
Rose v. KK Masutoku Toy Factory Co., 597 F.2d 215,
217-18 (10th Cir. 1979).
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 1133, 1135 (10th
Cir. 1979).
Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1122
(10th Cir. 1979).
Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 554 F.2d 1165,
1167-68 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799, 800-01 (6th Cir. 1973).
Prashar v. Volkswagen ofAm, Inc., 480 F.2d 947, 949-53
(8th Cir. 1973).
Chappell v. Rouch, 448 F.2d 446, 447-48 (10th Cir. 1971).
Anderson v. Papillion, 445 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir. 1971).
Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 604 (2d
Cir. 1968).
Groninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638, 639-40 (8th Cir.
1966).
2. District Courts
SchaiT v. Cameron Offshore Serv., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 48,
50-51 (W.D. La. 1979).
Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1093
(N.D.N.Y. 1977).
Cannon v. Metcalfe, 458 F. Supp. 843, 846-47 (E.D. Tenn.
1977).
Manatee Cablevision Corp. v. Pierson, 433 F. Supp. 571,
576 (D.D.C. 1977).




Sherwood . Graco, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 155, 156-57 (D.
Colo. 1977).
Bartholomeo v. Parent, 71 F.R.D. 86, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
Schinker v. Ruud Mfg. Co., 386 F. Supp. 626, 632-33
(N.D. Iowa 1974).
Leathers v. Serrell, 376 F. Supp. 983, 984 n.1 (W.D. Va.
1974).
Zarcone v. Condie, 62 F.R.D. 563, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 370 F. Supp. 1269, 1279 (E.D.
Pa. 1973).
Lits v. Refrigerated Transp. Co., 375 F. Supp. 675, 676
(M.D. Pa. 1973).
Bratel Y. Kutsher's Country Club, 61 F.R.D. 501, 502
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Krout . Bridges, 58 F.R.D. 560, 561 (N.D. Iowa 1973).
Janus . JM Barbe Co., 57 F.R.D. 539, 541 (N.D. Ohio
1972).
Prashar Y. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 347 F.
Supp. 129, 130 (D.S.D. 1972).
Meredith v. Glamorene Prod Corp., 55 F.R.D. 397, 399
(E.D. Wis. 1972).
Tanner Y. Presidents-First Lady Spa, Inc., 345 F. Supp.
950, 953, 958-61 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
McCrea v. General Motors Corp., 53 F.R.D. 384, 385 (D.
Mont. 1971).
Alford v. Whitsel, 52 F.R.D. 327, 329 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
Smith v. Seaboard Coast Line RR, 327 F. Supp. 536, 539
(D.S.C. 1971).
Anderson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399, 401 (W.D.
La. 1970).
GatliT Y. Little Audrey's Transp. Co., 317 F. Supp. 1117,
1119 (D. Neb. 1970).
Worldwide Carriers Ltd v. Aris S.S. Co., 312 F. Supp.
172, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Wheeler Y. Standard Tool & Mfg. Co., 311 F. Supp. 1177,
1178-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Grabowski v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 421, 422-23 (D.
Wyo. 1968).
Freeman v. Giacomo Costa Fu Andrea, 282 F. Supp. 525,
526 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
Hardy v. Green, 277 F. Supp. 958, 962 (D. Mass. 1967).
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Hendriksen v. Roosevelt Hosp., 276 F. Supp. 731, 733
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Elizabethtown Trust Co. v. Konschak, 267 F. Supp. 46, 48
(E.D. Pa. 1967).
Greeson v. Sherman, 265 F. Supp. 340, 342 (W.D. Va.
1967).
Morman v. Standard Oil Co., 263 F. Supp. 911, 913-14
(D.S.D. 1967).
Kaiser v. Mayo Clinic, 260 F. Supp. 900, 908 (D. Minn.
1966).
Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106, 110 (E.D. Pa.
1966).
Phillps v. Murchison, 252 F. Supp. 513, 518 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
Callan v. Lillybelle, Ltd, 39 F.R.D. 600, 601 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
D. From the date of the Walker decision to the date of the last
decision discovered.
[June 2, 1980 to June 5, 1981]
1. Courts of Appeals
Ellis v. Great S. W Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1103 (5th Cir.
1981).
Calhoun v. Ford, 625 F.2d 576, 577 (5th Cir. 1980).
Kerney v. Fort Griffin Fandangle Ass'n, 624 F.2d 717, 722
(5th Cir. 1980).
2. District Courts
Rosa v. Cantrell, 508 F. Supp. 330, 333 (D. Wyo. 1981).
Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 89 F.R.D. 63, 67-68
(E.D. Pa. 1981).
Slaughter v. Haughton, 89 F.R.D. 163, 165 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105, 1115
(E.D. Ky. 1980).
II. Decisions in cases brought on other bases of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.
[1938 through 1980]
A. Courts of Appeals
Caldwell v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th
Cir. 1980).
Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 635 F.2d 603,
608 (7th Cir. 1980).
Rule 3
Ralston Purina Co. v. Barge Juneau & Gulf Caribbean Marine
Lines, Inc., 619 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1980).
United States v. Miller, 609 F.2d 336, 338 (8th Cir. 1979).
United States v. Wahl, 583 F.2d 285, 287-88 (7th Cir. 1978).
Wrenn v. American Cast Iron Ppe Co., 575 F.2d 544, 546 (5th
Cir. 1978).
Windbrooke Dev. Corp. v. Environmental Enter., Inc., 524 F.2d
461, 463 (5th Cir. 1975).
Utah v. American Jipe & Constr. Co., 473 F.2d 580, 583 (9th
Cir. 1973), aftd, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
Maryland Tuna Corp. v. MS Benares, 429 F.2d 307, 320 (2d
Cir. 1970).
United States v. Gajewiski, 419 F.2d 1088, 1090-91 (8th Cir.
1969).
United States v. Woodbury, 359 F.2d 370, 375 (9th Cir. 1966).
Moore Co. Y. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co., 347 F.2d
921, 923 (8th Cir. 1965).
Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1953).
Pacpfc Employers Ins. Co. v. Parry Navigation Co., 195 F.2d
372, 373 (5th Cir. 1952).
Waterman v. Nelson, 177 F.2d 965, 965 (2d Cir. 1949).
Kessler v. Fleming, 163 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1947).
Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 1947).
Ore Steamshp Corp. v. D/SA/S Hassel, 137 F.2d 326, 329 (2d
Cir. 1943).
Reynolds v. Needle, 132 F.2d 161, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
Maier v. Independent Taxi Owner's Ass'n, 96 F.2d 579, 581
(D.C. Cir. 1938).
B. District Courts
Gutierrez v. Vergari, 499 F. Supp. 1040, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
New Eng. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Ratclffe v. Ins. Co. of N. Am, 482 F. Supp. 759, 763 & n.6
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
Davis v. Krauss, 478 F. Supp. 823, 825 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
Gardner . King, 464 F. Supp. 666, 668-70 (W.D.N.C. 1979).
Preston v. Mendlinger, 83 F.R.D. 198, 201-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Tyrolfv. VeteransAdmin., 82 F.R.D. 372, 374 (E.D. La. 1979).
United States v, Agnew, 80 F.R.D. 506, 507 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
Triplett . Azordegan, 478 F. Supp. 872, 878-79 (N.D. Iowa
1977).
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Dixon v. Universal Atlas Cement Div., 437 F. Supp. 1071, 1075
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